W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1984

Disaster and the Social Order: Organization and Emergent Units
Sarah Lee Saunders
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Saunders, Sarah Lee, "Disaster and the Social Order: Organization and Emergent Units" (1984).
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625283.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-k24q-cr98

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

DISASTER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
ORGANIZATION AND EMERGENT UNITS

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Sociology
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements of the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
SARAH LEE SAUNDERS
1984

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Author

Approved, August 1984

—

"A.

______

Gary A. Kreps, chair

David P. Aday, Jr.

Satoshi Ito

(

DEDICATION

To my mother and father who could never keep me
in the back yard, never wanted to, and have supported
me always in ny search of self and life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................

V

LIST OF TABLES..................................

vi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS............................

vii

ABSTRACT.......................................

viii

INTRODUCTION....................................

2

RELATED THEORY ON EMERGENT SOCIAL UNITS...........

16

MEASUREMENT AND MODEL OF EMERGENT
SOCIAL U N I T S ..........................

28

MODEL FINDINGS..................................

43

DISCUSSION......................................

64

APPENDIX 1 ......................................

71

APPENDIX 2 ......................................

74

APPENDIX 3 ......................................

78

BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................

85

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The conpletion of this thesis was necessarily a collective effort
whose quality depends enormously on the effort and dedication of the
people who helped create it.

Gary Kreps, whose enthusiasm about the

work, patience with and understanding of a beginner's work, provided a
source of motivation at times when I felt frustrated in the research
process.

Gary's insights and editorial comments were indispensable in

helping me turn out a finished copy.

David Aday, Jr.

and Satoshi Ito

provided a thorough critique of the work and inspired me to consider in
greater detail points which I had previously neglected, thereby
strengthening the final project.
A project of this kind also makes heavy demands, both indirect and
direct, on family and friends who have endured, indeed welcomed this
thesis' intrusion into their lives.

I am grateful to Nancy Saunders who

convinced me that writing a thesis amd enjoying one's time at home are
not mutually exclusive events;

John Saunders, who provided ceaseless

encouragement, and Eric Saunders who provided in his own way the impetus
to work hard.
assistance—

I am especially grateful to Bill Allred for the research
finding sources, xeroxing copies of articles, discussing

segments of the work— and emotional support which contributed to make
this thesis possible.

v

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1.

Taxonomy of Organized Responses.....

5

2.

Emergent Unit Response Domains.....

7

3.

Event Name, Number of Interviews and Responses .

4.

Organizational Forms for Emergent Units,
Formal Rationality-Collective Behavior
Metric..........................

36

Regression: Origins of Organization, Stage 1
Time of Initiation (TINT) and Physical
Location to Primary Impact (PLPI).

47

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

31

Regression: Origins of Organization, Stage 1
Social Network (NINDEXl) and Origins
Pattern (ORG-PAT).............
Regression: Maintenance of Organization, Stage 2
Complexity of Response (CR5) and Complexity
of Response (CR6)................

48

54

Regression: Maintenance of Organization, Stage 2
Response Task Structure Focus (RTSTRF) and
Social Network at Maintence (NINDEX2) . . . .
Regression: Suspension of Organization, Stage 3
Pattern of Suspension (POSP) and Total
Time of Response (TTR)...........

vi

55

60

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
1.

Page

A Model of Disaster and Emergent
Organization at Three System States...........

vii

15, 29

ABSTRACT
A theory, taxonomy, and model of 52 emergent social units are
developed from archival data which describe activities during the
emergency phase of 12 natural disasters. The thesis builds directly on
Kreps* (1983a; 1983b; 1984a; 1984b; 1984c) ongoing study of
organization. Kreps' theory of organization draws on Weber's
distinction between individual (historical) and general
(transhistorical) ideal types and the notions of structure and
collective representations developed respectively by Simmel and
Durkheim. Kreps defines four individually necessary and collectively
sufficient elements of organization— domain (D), tasks (T), human and
material resources (R), and activities (A) — which combine to form a
taxonomy of 24 logically possible forms of organization related by way
of a continuum. No assumptions are made regarding element arrangement
in time and space. Each empirically grounded pattern points
analytically to the autonomy and unity of social action and social order
as both relate to disaster. Kreps expresses the underlying unity
between goal oriented rational action (D T R A) and elemental collective
behavior (A R T D) by devising a metric which captures the
transitivities between the poles of the continuum (D T R A to A R T D).
The metric allows for the modeling of 24 forms of organization
represented in the taxonomy. The model of emergent units points to the
critical role of origins and spatial-temporal features in the process of
organization. The thesis closes by discussing key attributes of
emergent units, the relationship between emergent units and more
established processes of organization, and the need for a substantive
merger between collective behavior and organization perspectives.
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DISASTER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER:
ORGANIZATION AND EMERGENT UNITS

INTRODUCTION
The thesis which follows builds directly on Kreps1 (1983a?
1984a?

1984b?

1983b?

1984c) ongoing study of organization in which he

develops as unique strategy for advancing knowledge about disaster and
the social order.

Drawing from Kreps1 data file of 423 cases of

organization from 15 disaster events, I examine 52 cases of emergent
social units.

The remaining cases in his file are responses enacted by

established social units of various types (e.g., military units,
emergency relevant public bureaucracies). In effect, I adopt for
purposes of analysis, Kreps* perspective on organization and use his
taxonomy as a tool for interpreting emergent social unit responses in
disaster.
The following case description is one example from my study of what
is interpreted as an instance of emergent organization.

The example

highlights two dimensions of Kreps* definition of disaster which
distinguishes them as sociological events (1).
impacts (2) on social units (3).

These events have

The social units enact responses (4)

that are related to these impacts (Kreps, 1984b).

More important, the

case description best communicates Kreps* framework and the way it is
used in this study to interpret responses enacted by emergent social
units, both key dimensions of disaster.

It illustrates what we call a

D-R-A-T pattern at the origins of organization.
response relates to the care of victims.

2

The domain of this

3

A temporary morgue is set up after a tornado. The county
coroner is not a doctor but a local funeral director. He has
no coroner*s office, no staff, and no morgue. Normally, he
simply signs autopsies after they are completed by hospital
pathologists. After the tornado, spokesmen for the only local
hospital say their staff cannot handle those killed by the
event. They are equipped to handle only five cases per hour.
A discussion by the coroner and two pathologists at the
hospital leads to a decision to set up a temporary morgue.
So, four hours following the tornado the coroner calls an
acquaintance who works at the local YMCA and requests use of
the facility for the morgue. The YMCA director accedes to the
request (D). The coroner, the two pathologists, a licensed
embalmer, and a marine recruiter go to the YMCA. The YMCA
provides several rooms and a couple of staff. Thus, key
participants and material resources are mobilized next (R).
An hour later airbulances start bringing bodies to the morgue?
people come to the morgue concerned about the missing? bodies
start to be identified? local ministers who stop or come by
with concerned residents start attending to the needs of the
bereaved. It is evident that interdependent actions are
taking place, but there is no discemable structure of
activities (A). The need for "organization" is expressed by
the key participants. Gradually a simple task structure
emerges. The identified and unidentified dead are physically
separated, with the two pathologists attending to them. The
licensed embalmer and marine recruiter take on paper work
tasks. The coroner maintains liaison with the hospital,
funeral homes, and next of kin. Two ministers are asked to
remain and attend to the needs of the bereaved at another
location in the building (T). The morgue closes about 24-30
hours after it opens. All bodies are identified and
processed.
This observed instance of organization, as well as the others in
our analyses, points to a revered and important implication about human
action and the social order (Alexander, 1982).
observing human action.

Clearly, we are

But, as Simmel indicated long ago, such action

is enacted in ways that reflect alternative "forms of sociation" (Kreps,
1984a).

The subtleties of the forms are captured by using Kreps*

strategy for comparative study of the responses of social units.
But what is organization?

And, what are the component parts of a
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"pattern" or "form" of organization?

Organization is defined by Kreps

as both process and thing (unit). As process, organization is the
action of initiating, maintaining, and suspending structure— in the
present case, instances of disaster relevant structure of human
populations.

The term "process" clearly means the passage of time in

regard to organizational development and observation.

In this sense,

Kreps emphasizes the temporal ordering of the social properties of
organization.

Posited as a thing, organization is identified by the

co-presence of four analytically distinct elements.

The elements

(domain, tasks, human and material resources, activities) are therefore
individually necessary and collectively sufficient for organization to
exist.

They are treated as "structural" (objective) rather than

"individual" (subjective) characteristics of organization (Mayhew, 1980;
1981).

By structural, I am referring to them as emergent dimensions of

action and order.

They are, in effect, definable and interpretable as

social properties sui generis (Durkheim, 1947).
Each emergent unit in this study has a distinguishable pattern of
relationships among these four elements.

The subtleties of the patterns

are captured by using Kreps' typology which, by use of a factorial
design, points to twenty four logically possible pattern arrangements
(see Table 1).
Domains and tasks are interpreted as collective representations of
organized social action.

By collective representation Kreps means

generalized information (external given to individuals) which relates in
essential ways to time and energy use in the performance of

5

TABLE Is
Organizational
Forms

Taxonomy of Organized Responses
greps.'
Bata. File
Frequencies

Bpecgeo£-Ifoit
File

D-T-R-A
D-T-A-R
D-R-A-T
D-R-T-A
D-A-R-T
D-A-T-R

165
6
28
53
2
1

3
1
3
6
*
*

T-R-A-D
T-RHD-A
T-A-D-R
T-A-R-D
T-D-R-A
T-D-A-R

22
4
*
*
1
*

3
1
*
*
*
*

R-A-D-T
R-A-T-D
R-D-T-A
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
R-T-A-D

16
11
66
12
6
12

3
2
13
7
2
1

A-D-T-R
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R
A-T-R-D
A-R-D-T
A-R-T-D

2
*
2
4
6
i_

TOTAL

423

Frequgaci.es

*
*
*
1
3
1.
52

*Indicates Forms of Organized Response not yet located.
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activities— indicating what is taking place and how.
Staelser, 1962;

Others (e.g.,

Thompson, 1967) have pointed to the intra- and

inter-subjective meaning of collective representations that are
historically specific.

But in keeping with the structural theme, I

emphasize the material properties of collective representations which
take the form of information about social actions (communications,
organizational vocabularies, formal mandates, laws).

Human and material

resources and activities are the other material properties of
organization.

The elements are defined as follows.

Dogging
Domain is a collective representation of a broader system (e.g.,
community) function of an organized response (Thompson, 1967;
1978).

Wenger,

In the disaster context, domains identify actual or threatened

impacts as legitimate spheres of social action.

The several types of

domains (see Table 2) encompass pre-, trans-, and post-disaster time
periods.

They are evidenced by the communications of direct

participants and others related at the boundaries of enacting social
units.

A processual view of domain is centrally important.

Such a view

suggests that in some situations the domain of organization may be
evident before the event while in other situations, domain is a social
construction of the emergency period.

As a system property, domain has

normative import, specifying both internal and external legitimations
(via the content of information) of what participants in a response will
and will not do.

But the course of legitimation is also processual.

7

TABLE 2:

Emergent Unit Response Domains

DomainOVpe

Frequencies

Hazard-vulnerability analysis

1

Disaster preparedness, planning and training

1

Issuance of predictions and warnings

1

Dissemination of predictions and warnings

1

Evacuation

4

Mobilization of emergency personnel andresources

5

Search and rescue

3

Medical care

3

Providing victim basic needs

9

Damage needs and assessment and inventory of
available resources

1

Damage control

2

Public information

3

Local governance

1

Coordination and control

8

Reconstruction of physical structures

3

Reconstruction planning

4

Other

_JL

TOTAL

52

8

That is, there need not be a simultaneous internal-external occurance of
domain legitimation.

For instance, response participants may define and

adopt a particular domain type (care of victims as noted in the previous
exairple). This constitutes internal legitimation.

Following this,

relevant others (YMCA director) may provide external legitimation in one
or several ways (e.g., supplying resources, referring victims, honoring
requests for needed facilities).
Tasks
Tasks are collective representations of how a domain is enacted and
are communicated most pointedly by direct participants.
tasks for a given domain may range from few to many.

The number of

It is however, the

logical independence of tasks from domain that is essential to the
notion that organization is a bounded system.

As defined above, domain

very clearly depicts open system dynamics, for its existence is
predicated on both internal and external representation.

Tasks,

however, reveal more clearly the closed system information related to
the structuring and restructuring of human and material resources and
activities (Thompson, 1967).

Recognizing the independence of tasks and

domains is essential to a process model of organization as well.
is, tasks may be present following or prior to domain;

That

and in either

case, they may be pre-established or emerge as the event develops.
Jteeu. and .Material-Resources
People and their many attributes, commodities, and equipment are
the "raw materials" of any instance of organization (Zurcher and Show,
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1981).

Termed human and material resources, each may be controlled

internally within a response— further depicting the boundedness of
organization— or accessible through facilitating relationships.

In

either case, they ultimately combine with the remaining elements when
organization is enacted.

The relevance of human and material resources,

which often converge in great abundance following a disaster, is
socially determined.

They may mobilize before or after impact, and may

precede or follow the existence of domain and tasks in the process of
organization •
Activities
Activities are interdependent actions which articulate the raw
materials of organization (human and material resources) with collective
representations (domains and tasks) of what is happening.

It is

important to note that while activities constitute the actions of human
beings, they are "no more or less analytically important than the
remaining three elements" of organization (Kreps, 1984c, p.8).

In this

sense, activities relate co-equally to organization as both unit and
process.
Kreps also identifies three system states of organization;
initiation, maintenance, and suspension.
of relationships among the four elements.

Each state exhibits a pattern
Those initiated by domain and

tasks (D T) reflect goal oriented rational action or formal rationality
( D T R A interpreted as "perfect" formal rationality). Responses
dominated by activities or resources (A R) reflect an elemental form of
organization often referred to in disaster literature as collective
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behavior (Kreps, 1984a). By definition, the system state of initiation
ends when the last element falls into place making the transition from
initiation to maintenance one of logical necessity.

Because initiation

and suspension are characterized by attribute values (i.e.,
presence-absence of the four elements) the degree of presence is
centrally important.
that are critical.

Indeed, it is the threshold judgements of presence
During maintenance, organization is contingent upon

the four elements* presence in degree.

Thus, the more important task is

to account for property variances that may lead to pattern
reconstruction or suspension.

That is, if an element related

contingency emerges (e.g., a piece of equipment is damaged, participants
are lost, domain or tasks become unclear or questioned) the problem may
be resolved through restructuring of the elements and the response
continues until the demand is met or some new contingency appears.

If

the contingency is not resolved, the relevant element sets off the
process of suspension.

For both situations, judgements become critical

in terms of absence thresholds.

The following case description is one

example from my study of what is interpreted as task related
restructuring.
off the process.

That is, property variances in the task structure set
The response has a D R T A initiation pattern.

element contingency relates to the loss of a clearly defined task
structure.
The domain of the response involves the provision of medical
care. The community has been impacted by a major earthquake
(short forewarning). Sometime prior to the event, the local
Civil Defense, in conjunction with disaster preparedness
planning, designates the Director of a regional research
laboratory as Emergency Health Director. The current

The
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laboratory Director, being new to the position, is unaware of
the appointment and associated responsibilities. Two days
following the earthquake, the C.D. contacts the Director. He
is told to report to the nearest city administration building.
Upon arrival, a C.D. member outlines for him the response
domain. The director is in charge of coordinating key
community medical care services (D). Following the briefing,
approximately 30 nurses are mobilized and placed under the
direction of the Director (R). Together, they begin to work
on a task structure and define procedures for typhoid
vaccination (T). Next, he and the nurses split into groups,
go out to several area clinics, and begin vaccination
activities (A). Following the enactment of activities, the
Director is confronted with a water problem. The Director has
not anticipated, and thus is not prepared to handle the task
contingency which demands specific technical knowledge and
resources. The task structure becomes unclear and temporarily
problematic. The contingency is resolved when the Director
seeks advice from relevant sources and is subsequently given
several alternate plans from which to choose in order to deal
with the water problem. The inspection of restaurants, a new
response task, is not problematic for he is able to mobilize
in a short period of time a group of qualified inspectors (R)
and, in effect, tells them the specifics of their duties.
Related activities are carried out and both task demands are
met (A). Vaccination activities continue at least seven
weeks. After 38,000 typhoid shots are given, the supervision
of the Emergency Health Director is no longer needed.
Prior to suspension, the response pattern changes from D-R-T-A at
initiation to D-T-R-A at the maintenance of organization.
The parallels between Kreps' and my own study are many.

As

mentioned previously, I utilize Kreps' data source which conprises
archival data in the form of transcribed interviews provided by the
Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University.

In addition, I adopt

Kreps' perspective on organization and taxonomy of responses.

Our

studies hold to the tradition of disaster studies in that each is
concerned with how disaster and the social order are related (Prince,
1920;

Turner, 1967).

As researchers of disaster and organization we

are studying social events, units of analysis, and struggling with
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issues of concern in each field.

But the perspectives we hold toward

each represent significant points of departure from the traditions of
disaster and organization research.
First, we believe that the field's attention to the social order
makes it (disaster) a logical interest of mainstream sociology.

As we

aim to get a better handle on such concepts as disaster, collective
behavior, and organization we realize, along with Alexander (1982), that
such concepts are related one way or the other to matters of action and
order.
Second, we have divorced ourselves from the indifference in
mainstream sociology to the construction of taxonomies.

Enbracing

taxonomy is, in our judgement, the best way to conceptually relate human
vulnerability and social organization.
Kreps' perspective on and taxonomy of organization departs from
previous and contemporary conceptions and measurements found in the
literature (Etzioni, 1964;

Pugh, 1978;

Hall, 1982;

McKelvey, 1982;

and others)• Kreps' views the dearth of definitional and taxonomic work
on organization as problematic.

In this sense, he does not view

organization as a given characteristic of a social unit but that which
is to be defined and explained.

In addition, his perspective goes

beyond the traditional static conception of organization by emphasizing
both process and structure.
My study of 52 cases of emergent organization is not, however, a
replication of Kreps' work.

It is important, therefore, to highlight

what are interpreted as complementary differences which relate
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respectively to the nature of emergent and more established
organization, the role of origins, and the incorporation of key
spatial-temporal model variables.
The unique feature of emergent unit enactment— development within
circumscribed time and space and a short lived duration— make emergent
units in natural disaster both interesting examples of process and to
the extent accessible, amenable to joint observation and analysis.
Unlike other types of social units, emergent units in this analysis
transpired within days and sometimes hours.

And, as Gamson (1975)

suggests, the former type often take years to develop.

Because of their

lengthy enactment, researchers are often unable to observe and analyze,
particularly during the early stages, the internal and external dynamics
of organization.

In this sense, my analysis of 52 emergent social units

in the disaster context further contributes to our understanding of the
process of organization.
Qie could argue, therefore, that all instances of organization are
said to emerge.

However, the term "emergent" is applicable to my unit

of analysis in lieu of their temporal and spatial features mentioned
above.

In effect, the term emergent is used as a summative concept

(Dubin, 1978) which emphasizes the key feature of these instances of
organization.
The thrust of my thesis is to identify other distinct features as
well, namely those which are comparable to features of more established
social units.

To begin to address this basic question, I direct the

reader to the marginals for the 52 cases presented on Table 1 (pg.5).

14

Here, we note taxonomy frequencies for Kreps' 423 cases and the 52
emergent units.

It is evident that documented patterns in each study

include more goal oriented rational action (D T R A), elemental
collective behavior (A R T D) and the permutations between.

From this I

begin the argument against traditional assumptions which define emergent
social units as "means" (activities, resources) related, "collective
behavior" (Turner and Killian, 1972), or "relatively unorganized"
responses (Mileti et al., 1975).

In this sense, my work holds to Kreps'

immediate objective which is to contribute to the merging of collective
behavior and organizational perspectives on action and order in the
disaster context.
Unlike Kreps, I incorporate temporal and spatial variables which
highlight the dynamics of the origins of emergent social units.

Since

our data do not allow for hypothesis testing, my study is a process of
exploratory modeling.

From the model of emergent social units (see

Figure 1) I portray findings as they relate to emergent units in
disaster and I suspect, other forms of organization as well.
In sum, ny objective is to (1) add information related to the
development of a taxonomy of organization and emergent social units that
stem directly from Kreps* perspective of organization, and (2) analyze
the process of organization for 52 units in order to assess further the
role of origins.
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RELATED THEORY ON EMERGENT SOCIAL UNITS

The notions of both structure and process emphasized in Kreps*
(1983a;

1983b;

1984a;

1984b;

1984c) work have been developed from

the classics as well as contemporary works.

It is important to

remember, however, that Kreps* perspective on organization and
collective behavior represents a significant departure from the
conceptual and theoretical traditions of each field.

In the section

which follows these differences will become clearer as I further examine
respectively the notions of (1) structure, (2) collective behavior vis a
vis organization (structure), and (3) space-time factors.

These notions

are reflected in the works of Simmel, Durkheim, and Weber and more
recent scholars such as Smelser, Gamson, Skocpal, and Giddens.

The

ideas in this analysis which these notions inform have direct
implications for our perspective on organization and the analysis of
emergent social units.
In Kantian manner, Sinmel (1965) intimates that the form of social
action (i.e., knowledge) is notably distinct from its content.
Knowledge, for example initially appears as a means in the
struggle for existence, but it comes to be cultivated for its
own sake autonomously, as happens in science (Martindale,
1982, p.228).
That is, Simmel refers to the analytical distinction between the form
and content of inter-human action.

In his discussion of "sociability",

Simmel ties a notion of structure to the identification of structural
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elements as they relate to social action.

But how is the content of

social action to be denoted?
Abel (1970) clarifies the Simmelian distinction between form and
content as something other than that which is abstract or concrete,
structural or material, formal or substantive.

Instead,

forms-of-sociation in human interaction constitute a "mode of
reciprocity between persons manifest in their actions toward each other,
their attitudes, and their mutual evaluations" (Abel, 1970, p.84).
Simmel intimates, therefore, that "forms-of-sociation" are patterned
social actions comprised of structural elements.

Are then, collective

representations (domain, tasks) structural elements of human
interaction?
Durkheim (1947) said that collective representations represent "the
totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average citizens of the
same society" (Durkheim, 1947, p.49).

Because these beliefs are

interpreted holistically they are, therefore, distinguished by their
exteriority and constraint (Martindale, 1981) and found in the
solidarity features of society.
Collective representations constitute a reality sui generis. That
is, they are more than the summation of individual attitudes and
beliefs.

But this critical feature of collective representations proved

problematic for Durkheim.

In effect, he was unable to distinguish them

as either intersubjective meanings or social facts (structure). Perhaps
he was simply being flexible about substantive problems of action and
orders
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Moreover, it does not change with each generation, but, on the
contrary, it connects successive generations with one another.
It is, thus, an entirely different thing from particular
consciences, although it can be realized only through them
(Durkheim, 1947, p.80).
Given the breadth and nature of the problem Durkheim was struggling
with, many since him have questioned the efficacy of classifying
collective representations as social structures.

If one assumes that

both "individual" and "group" are analytical rather than concrete terms,
and that neither has ontological primacy, then collective
representations can be seen as having external (material) and internal
(subjective) dimensions (Alexander, 1982).

I feel that these are

reasonable assumptions.
The tradition of collective behavior studies is indicative of the
debate between collective representations as social facts (structure) or
essentially individual expressions.

The tendency has been for

collective behaviorists to analyze emergent social units in
psychological terms.

From earlier theorists (Lebon, 1960 reprint) to

relatively contemporary exemplars (Lang and Lang, 1961?

Smelser, 1962)

the distinction is made between social movements, crowds, and mass
behavior and, on the other hand, conventional or more formal groups and
organizations.
associations.

Each has been described as collective representations or
However, not only are the participants of each viewed as

different "species" (Gamson, 1975) but their forms are interpreted as
distinctive and "relatively enduring" as well.
For example, Lang and Lang (1961) compare collective behavior and
more formal social action and suggest that they differ in terms of form
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and content.

They argue that participants in collective behavior

respond without the advantage of social expectations or the guidance of
social structures (Weller and Quarantelli, 1973).

By implication, this

means that a structural analysis of emergent units is unlikely.

Lang

and Lang contend that most structures associated with conventional units
are "either lacking or not determining factors" when applied to emergent
ones (Lang and Lang, 1961, p. 13).
Staelser (1962) provides a different interpretation by pointing to a
similarity between collective and more formal behavior.

In doing so, he

outlines a typology of generalized beliefs associated with collective
representations for they reflect the normative content of collective
behavior. The types are defined as follows:
(1)

hysteria, which transforms an ambiguous situation
into an absolutely potent generalized threat;

(2)

wish-fulfillment, which reduces ambiguity by positing
absolutely plausible generalized facilities;

(3)

hostility, which involves removing some agent or
object perceived as a generalized threat;

(4)

value oriented beliefs, which envision the
reconstruction of a threatened value system; and

(5)

norm-oriented beliefs, which envision the
reconstruction of a threatened normative structure.

None, however, parallel Durkheim*s definition of collective
representations because Staelser views generalized beliefs as
"peculiarities .

.

. that activate people for participation in

episodes of collective behavior" (Smelser, 1962, P.80).

The content of

such beliefs are interpreted by Staelser as "problems" which are then
elevated to a workable level.

In addition this process of activation is
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viewed as normal and rational.

The difference, though, is that

collective behavior produces generalized beliefs which are spontaneous
and lack continuity.

Gamson (1975) calls the process in which they

emerge "short circuiting" because actors in collective behavior usually
move from the abstract phase of problem formulation to the source of
attention.

In this sense, emergent social units enact a predictable

jump between these two aspects of action in the absence of a clearly
defined task structure.
In sum, Staelser's statements on collective behavior point to two
contradicting assumptions about emergent social units.

First, though he

fails to cite Weber, his subjectivist interpretation of collective and
more formal behavior reflects the Weberian logic of formal rationality
(e.g., domain precedes activities).
Present in all collective behavior is some kind of belief that
prepares the participants for action. . . . This preparing
function is implicit in our view of generalized beliefs as
determinants that add their value in the process that builds
up to an episode of collective behavior (Staelser, 1962, p.83).
His interpretation of social behavior suggests similarities between
collective behavior and more formal behavior in terms of organization
pattern.

That is, both emergent and more formal social units in

disaster may be more "ends" (domain,tasks) as opposed to "means"
(activities, resources) oriented.

But as Table 1 (pg.5) suggests,

emergent and established units cover the entire range of 24 logical
possibilities in terms of organization pattern.

On the other hand, and

perhaps in keeping more with traditional views of collective behavior,
Staelser implies the improbability of instances of organization in regard
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to various forms of collective behavior.
But what is formal rationality and how does it relate to patterns
of organization?

Formal rationality is one of four types of

"rationality" investigated by Weber (Kalberg, 1980).

Manifest in social

actionr formal rationality develops in specific spheres of life (e.g.,
economic, science) and is associated with a bureaucratic form of
domination.

Formally rational procedures legitimate practical

calculations and employ techniques "with little regard to persons".
They operate with calculations of "the most precise and efficient means
for the resolution of problems by ordering them under universal and
abstract regulations" (Kalberg, 1980, p. 1158).
In the disaster context, the interpretation and application of this
concept suggests the predominance of domain initiated responses.

Given

Krepsr four essential elements of organization, the pattern of
development most representative of Weber's notion of formal rationality
is the following;
Domain— Tasks— Human and Material Resources— Activities
(Kreps, 1983a)
This pattern (D T R A) points to Weber's broader notion of goal oriented
rational action.

Activities are logically predicated by resource

mobilization, task development, and domain respectively.

Deviations

from this pattern are interpreted as increasingly less formally rational
and less routine.

Deviations are also considered by some as less

"efficient" as a consequence of deviation (Price, 1968).

Weber's

conception of goal oriented rational action, or formal rationality
provides an interesting interpretation of organized responses in a
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disaster emergency period.

For instance, one would suppose that domain

or task initiated responses would occur most often— in established as
well as emergent social units— and be time and energy saving.

As has

been shown (see Table 1, pg.5), the data do not support that
presumption.
Contemporary organization literature provides several exanples of
researchers who make assumptions similar to Weber and Smelser regarding
the rational nature of organizations.
is a classic example.

The statement by Etzioni (1961)

He defines organization as:

a human grouping deliberately constructed to seek specific
goals . • . organizations are characterized by: (1)
divisions of labor, power, and communication responsibilities,
divisions which are not randomly or traditionally patterned,
but deliberately planned; (2) the presence of one or more
power centers vdiich control and direct them toward its goals;
these power centers also continuously review the
organization's performance and repattem its structure, where
necessary, to increase its efficiency; (3) substitution of
personnel . . ." (Etzioni, 1961, p.3).
From Etzioni's definition one might infer that emergent groups are the
result of conscious planning, not the specific context from which they
develop.

Context, however, interpreted here as origins has a critical

role in the subsequent development of organization.

More important,

those pointing to formal rationality (as Etzioni does) usually assume
the existence of organization, while those pointing to collective
behavior usually presume its absence.

Although both assumptions are

unwarranted in the disaster context, appearances may be deceiving in any
context.
Few researchers of social movements or organization would disagree
with the idea that all social units have origins.

Yet, recognition of
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the significance of origins in the process of organization varies
greatly.

From the works of writers who do recognize the critical role

or orgins I infer not only the relevance of organization context but
spatial and temporal features as each relate to emergent social unit
enactment.
For examplef Kimberly et al.f (1980) assert that the "life cycle"
concept of organization compels the scientist to acknowledge seriously
and appreciate the importance of origins.

They argue that

organizations, like biological entities, have an identifiable history
and context from which they develop.

These origins may, in turn, inpact

the structure or pattern of organization in one or more of its system
states (Paige, 1975;

Kimberly et al., 1980;

Skocpol, 1981;

McKelvey,

1982).
Similarly, Skocpol (1981), who adopts a structural approach in her
study of social revolutions, gives particular emphasis to the origins
and structural features of organizational environments.

According to

Skocpol, a purposive or individualistic analysis assumes the process of
organization to be the direct result of individual decision making.
And, the resulting interpretation tends to be highly misleading when
presenting the process and outcomes of historical instances, as well as
their causes.
Developing the point further, Skocpol asserts that
successful social revolutions probably emerge from different
macro-structural and historical contexts than do either failed
social revolutions or political transformations that are not
acconpanied by transformations of class relations (Skocpol,
1981, p.5).
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Her treatment of and emphasis on the origins and historical context of
social revolutions touch on matters which are central to the disaster
context.

In addition, Skocpol1s perspective resonates with that of the

population ecologists (Hannon and Freeman, 1977;
emphasis on "ecological context".

McKelvey, 1983) in her

That is, social unit (emergent unit,

social revolution) comparability of specific instances of emergent
social units and "of the broader social network of the focal unit is a
necessary condition for new (emergent) organization" (Francis and Kreps,
1984, p.32).
Weller and Quarantelli1s (1973) article highlights a typology of
collective bdiavior and suggests the significance of origins for each
type.

The typology points to the source of and depicts three kinds of

emergent collectivities.

Their concentration on systems of norms and

social relationships reflects the potentially routine nature of some
elements of organization.

They consider the source of these elements

"with respect to the social setting in which behavior takes place"
(Weller and Quarantelli, 1972, p.679). Unfortunately, they do not
pursue the matter further.

Weller and Quarantelli leave essentially

unspecified the sources of social norms and social relationships.
Skocpol's (1981) analysis also incorporates a critical theoretical
component to which the disaster context commands our attention;
concept of time or what she calls "world time".

the

Here, world time is

utilized as a key contextual variable and comprises the peripheral and
transitory environment of social phenomena.
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Ch the one hand, there are the structures of the world
capitalist economy and the international states system, within
which individual nations are situated in different positions.
And on the other hand, there are changes and transmissions in
world time which affect both the overall world contexts within
which revolutions occur and the particular models and options
for action that can be borrowed from abroad by revolutionary
leadership (Skocpol, 1981, p.23).
Skocpol implies, therefore, that emergent units may and frequently
do develop within the context of other disaster relevant organization.
Each organization may reflect relatively similar or dissimilar patterns
of organization.

Second, assuming that the patterning of organization

may change over time, those observed immediately following the disaster
(her referent is revolution) may significantly differ from those
observed during the later phases of the emergency period.

Thus the

actual time a group emerges may operate as an influential variable
regarding the pattern of origins and maintenance.
Giddens (1979) argues that the concept of time is involved in any
model of a patterning process.

In regard to organization, this opinion

would necessitate a dynamic view of the process.

But as Giddens

suggests, most theorists don't incorporate time as a variable when
referring to social structures.
functionalist perspectives.

This is particularly characteristic of

For them, time has traditionally been

associated with process and structure with stability.
reflects one of two tendencies;

The association

either the assurnption of change or

presunption that social interactions may exist in "static stability"
(Giddens, 1979, p.202).

Any identifiable pattern of interaction must be

located within a given time period because "only when examined over time
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do they form patterns at all" (Giddens, 1979, p.202)•
static analysis of social structures is not verifiable.

In addition, a
"There is

simply no way in which a static analysis can actually be carried out;
the study of social activity invokes the lapse of time just as the
activity itself does" (Giddens, 1979, p. 199).
Giddens also stresses the importance of spatial factors in any
analysis, though it too is frequently given short shrift in theory
building efforts.

The reasons for omission are not entirely clear, but

Giddens highlights a few possibilities.

For example, socio-theoretical

exclusions of the concept may result from a fear of attributing
geographical determinism.

On the other hand, many researchers disregard

the importance of spatial variables because they assume an image of
structural or environmental space as given.

By doing so, each fail to

realize that spatial factors reflect more than the distance between two
objects or persons, geographical locations, physical environments,
settings, or any combination of these.

In the disaster context, the

spatial and environmental characteristics of a disaster are likely to
include those elements which are "routinely drawn upon by social actors
in the sustaining of communication" (Giddens, 1979, p.207).
The concepts of time and space are interpreted as central to the
definition and explanation of the process of organization.

Indeed, the

analysis to follow incorporates two preliminary variables which are,
respectively, spatial and temporal.

Related findings point to their

potential contributions to our knowledge of emergent organization.

In

sum, the notions of rationality, collective behavior, space and time are
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interpreted as significant for the form and content of emergent
organization.

The following section includes a discussion of how each

of these dimensions are incorporated in exploratory modeling of the
origins, maintenance, and suspension of 52 instances of emergent
organization that were previously identified by Kreps.

MEASUREMENT AND MODEL OF EMERGENT SOCIAL UNITS

In the following section, details are provided on the measurement
of variables which characterize the 52 emergent social units.

The

variables point to dimensions of organization discussed in the previous
section and are incorporated in exploratory modeling of emergent
organization.

I begin by describing respectively Kreps* data source,

event selection, and data production requirements of the model.

Next,

starting with exogeneous variables, I discuss blocks of model variables
in the order of their arrangement (see Figure 1).
The theory and model of emergent social units relate to earlier
studies by the Disaster Research Center (DRC of the Ohio State
University) which focused on social action during the emergency phase of
selected natural disasters.
teams to disaster sites.

The DRC traditionally sent out research

These teams gathered any and all information

possible via personal interviews with participants and various types of
documents which depict the actions of social units.

The data were not

collected with any given theoretical framework in mind, thus, interviews
were, in most cases, unstructured.

Essentially, efforts were made to

document action sequences of events during the emergency period of
natural disasters.

The original data are stored in the DRC's

well-maintained archives in the form of transcribed interviews and
documents.
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As any disaster researcher knows, the environment for data
collection is far from ideal (Drabek, 1970),

It is clear, therefore,

that the way the initial studies were conducted by the DRC (1963-1970)
influence the nature or quality of compiled information.

For example,

researchers selected participants of disaster relevant established
organizations (e.g., RED Cross, police departments) as principle
interviewees because their involvement was expected, they were
available, and they were cooperative.

A selection process of this type

prohibits the disclosure of other comparably significant disaster
responses, notably emergent social units engaged in various domains.
Notwithstanding this data collection bias, information on important
emergent units often became available and was collected on site.
Disaster events examined by Kreps were a sample of these initial
DRC studies.

His selection procedure reflects both purposive and quota

sampling strategies (Babbie, 1973).
N of 423 cases was obtained.
drawing from 1,062 interviews.

Data production continued until an

Efforts ended with a sample of 15 events
Table 3 lists the sample of events,

number of responses and interviews associated with the 52 emergent
social units.

I have re-analyzed all interviews (transcribed) related

to the 52 emergent units for purposes of generating the model reported
in Figure 1.
Figure 1 points to the data production requirements of the
exploratory model that has been developed.

First, empirical patterns of

origins, maintenance, and suspension had to be documented.
other factors which relate to these patterns were recorded

Second,
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TABLE 3:

Event Name, Number of Interviews and Responses

Events
1.

Alaska Earthquake
1964

2.

frlPtecYieKS

#-Responses

18

15

Hurricane Betsy
(New Orleans), 1965

6

5

3.

Hurricane Camille
(Gulf Coast) , 1969

7

5

4.

Belmond, Iowa
Tornado, 1966

3

1

5.

Oak Lawn Chicago, 111.
Tornado, 1967

1

1

6.

Jonesboro, Ark.
Tornado, 1968

7

3

7.

Topeka, Kansas
Tornado, 1966

5

6

8.

Central South Colorado
Floods, 1965

3

2

9.

Mankato, Minn.
Flood, 1965

4

1

14

9

10.

Fairbanks, Alaska
Flood, 1967

11.

Minot, North Dakota
Flood, 1969

3

3

12.

Fargo, North DakotaFlood,
Flood, 1969

2

1

Totals

73

52
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(e.g., participant characteristics) as were exogeneous variables.
I have only scratched the surface of what ultimately will be
needed, but obviously I must work within the constraints of what is
available.

In sum, the model explicitly points to the process and

structure of organization.

It gives particular emphasis to the origins

of organization and how other factors relate to then.
My core measurement problem involved, specifically, identifying and
recording patterns of origins in terms of the 24 logical possibilities
highlighted by Krepsf taxonomy (see Table 1, pg.5)?

then relating these

patterns to characteristics of events (event type, type of domain),
impacted community unit characteristics (size, disaster experience,
relevance of military units), spatial and temporal features of
organization (time of initiation, closeness to primary impact area),
participant characteristics (number involved, key resources at
initiation, social links to activity area, orientations in
communication), complexity of social network at initiation and
maintenance, conplexity of response (means/ends problems, task structure
focus), reason for suspension, and length of response.

Modeling.■of...Smer.g^QtLQrg.9nigati<?o
A.

Exogeneous Variables
Five exogeneous variables are included in the model.

event-impact related and three are community unit related.

Two are
Recalling

Kreps' (1984a) definition of disaster (see page 2 of text) it is
important to keep analytically distinct the four dimensions of disaster
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and the broader system (community) in which responses are enacted.

In

this way we are better able to separate the effects of each and describe
and explain the dynamics of social unit responses.
Each of the 52 responses emerged within the context of one of four
types of disaster events (EVEMFTP); tornado, hurricane, earthquake, or
flood.

These events have what Kreps calls "property spaces" which are

related to the magnitude and scope of their impact.

In addition, each

property space has physical, temporal, and spatial dimensions.

Treating

events as independent variables, I emphasize the temporal dimensions of
inpact.

That is, events were coded according to ordinal distinctions in

their length of forewarning.

Earthquakes (1), tornadoes (2), and floods

and hurricanes (3) were coded such that higher scores on this variable
indicate greater forewarning time.
Using Kreps' typology of disaster domains (see Table 2;
identified at least seventeen distinct domains.

ACTN) I

The typology was

collapsed in an effort to isolate those domains which were (1)
immediately post-impact and therefore urgent and (2) whose enactment was
less likely before the event (e.g., medical care, search and rescue).
These domains were coded "1" (N=32) and the remaining types "0" for the
52 cases.

The decision to collapse disaster domains was based on the

idea that emergent groups may take on more time urgent demands until
established organizations are able to recoup and take over.

Moderate

differences were evidenced between my own and the larger study of 423
responses.

Kreps hypothesized that the timing of collective

representation in the enactment of organization may be related to domain
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ambiguity.

The correlation between organization pattern (QRG-PAT) and

domain type (ACTN) does not, however, support this hypothesis (r=-.01;
see Appendix 1).
C-EXP is used to measure ordinal distinctions of increasing
community disaster experience.

Variable values range from "1" no

disasters, few threats (N=8), "2" no disasters several threats (N=30),
"3" one or more disasters (N=12), to "4" one disaster several threats
(N=2). The measure of community size (CCMM) was collapsed to highlight
responses which emerged in a ”1" metropolitan (50,000+) as opposed to a
"0" non-metropolitan area (N=26). LOCMIL is used to measure spatial
proximity and social relevance of military units to emergent
organization.
relevance;

Higher scores indicate ordinal distinctions of increasing

"1" at some distance (N=4), "2" close proximity, no

relevance (N=22), and "3" close proximity, relevance (N=26).
B.

Organization: Initiation
The distributions in Table 1 (pg.5) provide information on the

documented patterns of organization at initiation (QRG-PAT). The 24
logical patterns of organization are related by way of a continuum.
Each illustrates Weber's notion of individual (historical) ideal types.
The typology of which they are a part emphasizes Simmel's distinction
between form and content discussed in the previous section.

In order to

express the underlying unity between collective behavior (A R T D) and
more goal oriented rational action (formal rationality, D T R A) Kreps
(1983b) provides a metric of organization.
Kreps gave each of the 24 organization forms a score ranging from
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"0" to "6".

Capturing the transitivities from D T R A t o A R T D was a

key requirement for metric construction.

For, as a taxonomy of social

responses, each type points analytically to the autonomy and unity of
action and order as both relate to disaster (Alexander, 1982).
accomplished this objective in the following way.
continuum is "perfect" formal rationality;
A;

T precedes R, A;

and R precedes A.

Kreps

At one end of the

where D precedes T, R, and

Given one point for each

conforming transitivity D T R A receives a score of "6" while A R T D
receives a score of "0".

The midpoint of the metric, "3", highlights

"how the process of formal rationality and collective behavior are
balanced in the 6 types represented" (Kreps, 1984a).

In effect, Kreps'

metric, based on the continuum, allows modeling of 24 forms of
organization represented in the taxonomy.

I use this seven level

ordinal scale for the purposes of model building.
The spread of 52 cases presented in Table 4 is very important in
regard to the distribution of metric values.

Frequencies for QRG-PAT

indicate that the 52 emergent units do not predominately reflect either
more elemental collective behavior or formal rationality.

Indeed,

emergent unit patterns fill the entire range of metric values.

This

tells us that assumptions about the pattern and process of organization
are unwarranted in the disaster context for emergent social units.
Nine measures of participant characteristics are included in the
model.

Perhaps more than any other block this group of variables

provides insight on the social psychological aspect of organization.
First, three dummy variables were created to emphasize the salient
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TABLE 4: Organizational Forms for Emergent Units,
Formal Rationality - Collective Behavior Metric
Organizational
Forms

Logical
Metric

D-T-R-A

6

1

D-T-A-R
D-R-T-A
T-D-R-A

5

3

7

D-R-A-T
D-A-T-R
T-R-D-A
T-D-A-R
R-D-T-A

4

5

17

D-A-R-T
T-R-A-D
T-A-D-R
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
A-D-T-R

3

6

12

T-A-R-D
R-A-D-T
R-T-A-D
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R

2

5

4

R-A-T-D
A-T-R-D
A-R-D-T

1

A-R-T-D

0
Totals

Brrpirical
Instances

Forms

3

3

6
1

3

24

52
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topics in the communication network of response participants,

EMP

points to responses in vdiich participants expressed a high degree of
empathy for others (N=30). PERS isolates responses whose participants
were concerned with victims' emotional and material loss (N=21) and CCMC
those concerned with community damage and participant control of
response (N=26). The N of such responses exceeds 52 and thereby
reflects emergent units with several different focuses in communication
network.
All responses are called emergent (no pre-event existence). Some
however were carried out by "0" emergent groups of individuals (N=24) or
”1" emergent groups of other groups and organizations (FOT), The number
of participants (SIZ) was the referent for the size of the responding
units.

Measurement was as follows;

"1" 9 or fewer (N=ll), "2" 10 to 20

(N=10), "3" 21 to 50 (N=10), and "4" over 50 members (N=21).
DESTAB and TOEV are two dummy variables created to measure
respectively the time order development of domain legitimation and task
development.

DESTAB isolates responses in which "1" internal domain

legitimation clearly precedes external legitimation (N=36). The case
description on page two (see Introduction) points to one example where
internal legitimation precedes external legitimation.

Similarly, TDEV

isolates responses whose participants develop their own task structure
(N=44) as opposed to adopting one developed by a relevant other.

Case

description #118 (Appendix 2) points to a situation where participants
develop their ovm task structure.

Here, the civilian and city
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secretaries, without the aid or advise of the local Civil Defense,
devise a simple task structure whereby they receive calls on a hotline
and use the radio to broadcast names of missing persons.

Case

description #266 (Appendix 2) points to a response where participants
adopt a task structure developed, initially, by a relevant other.

In

this example, the student body president goes to the university
president for assistance in developing a task structure.

For this

instance of organization, assistance from a relevant other was critical
for the enactment of organization.
Some response participants were aware of ongoing disaster relevant
activity in varying degrees.

Such awareness was interpreted as an

indication of social links to dominant activity areas (SIDA) and
analytically distinct from the measured patterns of social network at
initiation and maintenance of organization.

Most responses were judged

as socially isolated at initiation (N=29).
TINT and PLPI are only a start on the important direction of data
production on the process of organization.

That is, I believe that

subsequent analyzes of organization should incorporate other relevant
spatial and temporal variables.

PLPI is a dummy variable created to

measure a response’s closeness to the primary impact area.
responses were spatially integrated.

Most (N=37)

TINT measures the time of

initiation or the ordinal distinction of when the first element of
organization emerges.

Values range from "0" more than 72 hours

pre-impact (N=3), "1" less than 72 hours pre-impact (N=5), "2" one to
two hours post-inpact (N=ll), "3" three to twenty four hours post-impact
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(N=8), "4" twenty five to seventy two hours post-impact (N=15), to "5"
beyond seventy two hours post-impact (N=10). Both TINT and PLPI are
structural variables and represent ordinal distinctions of spatial and
temporal location.
Instances of organization may be linked to a broader network of
responding units in ways other than by awareness of disaster relevant
activity (SIDA). As in Kreps1 (1983b) study, evidenced links at
initiation (PINT) were measured in the following way:

measurement began

by identifying responses that were "1" self-contained (no relationships
represented) or "2" linked to other focal organizations at initiation
(at local, state, or national level, N=44). The number of links
(INLINKS) at initiation was also measured:

"0" no links (N=32), "1" one

or more links (N=2Q). PINT and INLINKS were moderately correlated
(r=.43) and each contributes unique information about social network at
initiation of organization.

PIMP and INLINKS were then combined

(additively) to form an index of social network density at initiation
(NINDEX1). Almost half (N=23) of the responses have a simple social
network at initiation.
C.

Organization: Maintenance
Measurement of complexity of response at the maintenance state of

organization began by recording the number of tasks noted by
participants (RTSTR) throughout the course of the response.

Since most

of these tasks were evidenced at the height of organized activity they
are referenced at the maintenance state.

RTSTR measures responses

having "1" sinple task structures (less than four) and "2" more complex
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task structures (four or more).

Where the actual number was uncertain/

responses were coded as simple on this dimension.

The frequencies on

this dimension evidence a larger nunber of complex task structures
(N=39/ 59.6%) compared to Kreps' larger study where responses were split
about evenly (52.9% coded as simple).
Next, I recorded any response related contingency expressed by
participants or relevent others in the disaster context.

I did not

question the exactitude of these expressions but merely recorded
descriptions of them as they related to domain (DDPR), tasks (TDPR),
human and material resources (RMPR), and activities (AFPR). Pinpointing
the timing of these contingencies was difficult, therefore, they too
were referenced at the maintenance state for purposes of model building.
DDPR, TDPR, RMPR, and APPR were created such that one or more
contingency could be coded.

For example, case #266 is a response where

relevant others expressed activities performance problems.

Here,

university students acting as a key resource at initiation, were
described as creating activity related problems. That is, during the
height of activity, enough students were drinking beer while on work
location that city police were expecting problems that never
materialized.
As in Kreps' study two interaction terms (CR5 and CR6) were
created.

The logic for their creation is based on the analytical

distinction between "ends" (D T related) and "means" (A R related)
during the maintenance state of organization (Thompson, 1967;
1983).

Starbuck,

CR5 combines (multiplicatively) RTSTR (response task structure)

41

with domain (DDPR) and tasks (TDPR) contingency variables.

CR6 combines

in like manner RTSER with activities (APPR) and resource (RMPR)
contingency variables.

Each index (CR5 and CR6) simultaneoulsly capture

the distinction between "means" and "ends" and the complexity of the
response.

Higher scores reflect increasing response complexity.

KfSTRF measures the degree to vtfiich task structures are focused.
Certainly, all task structures are focused to some degree, regardless if
they are simple or complex.
than others.

Some, however, are more explicitly focused

Therefore, RTS1RF, was used to measure ordinal

distinctions in reference to physical, social, and temporal dimensions.
Measurement was as follows:

"0" no specific task structure focus

(N=12), "1" focus on one of three dimensions (N=19), "2" focus on two of
three dimensions (N=18), and "3" focus on all three dimensions (N=3). A
response task structure which was physically focused was carried out in
a particular location (e.g., highschool gymnasium).

Social dimensions

include participant attention directed toward particular victim groups
(e.g., children).

Tenporally focused task structures were formulated

and enacted by participants with certain time limitations collectively
understood (e.g., before sundown).
A second measure of social network density (NINDEX2) is referenced
at the maintenance state of organization.
procedure was used as for NINDEXl.
(additively) to form NINDEX2.

Here, the same measurement

PMNT and IMNLINKS were combined

Differences evidenced between NINDEXl

(44% coded as simple) and NINDEX2 (11.5% coded as simple) point to rapid
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changes that are likely to occur in the "fluidity" of disaster
situations (Kreps, 1984a).
D.

Organization: Suspension
A response may be suspended for a variety of reasons (POSP). For

instance, the response may persist until the demand is met, be absorbed
by another entity (e.g., Salvation Army), or lose a critical human or
material resource.

The measurement of these reasons provided some

insight regarding the survivorship of organization as a key element of
process.

Measurement was, however, weak on this response dimension.

POSP was collapsed in an effort to isolate responses which "1"
contintued until the demand was met, or though in process, outcome was
probable (N=26). All other reasons for suspension were coded "0".
Treated as a dependent variable, TTR measures ordinal distinctions
in response duration.

Measurement was as follows:

"1" lasted one to

two days (N=7), "2" lasted two to five days (N=16), "3" lasted six to
fourteen days (N=19), and "4" over two weeks (N=10). Here, I examine
how all model variables influence the total time organization lasts.
The following section provides a more detailed discussion of the model
findings.

MODEL FINDINGS
Step-wise multiple regression techniques were used for examination
of model relationships at three system states of organization:
initiation, maintenance, and suspension.

Tables 5 through 9 provide

information obtained from ten separate regressions which relate to these
system states and will be discussed respectively.

At each stage of

organization, variables are regressed against all others at that stage,
those at preceding stages, and the two sets of exogeneous variables.
For instance, at Stage 2 (Maintenance of Organization) NINDEX2 is
regressed against organization conplexity, NINDEX1, organization pattern
at origins, organization participant characteristics, spatial-temporal
characteristics, event characteristics, and community unit
characteristics (see Figure 1).

Thus, step-wise procedures are

sequential in that each regression equation has as candidate predictors
everything to the left of it on the diagram.
A .10 inclusion criterion is used for adding variables in the
equation.

The lesser criterion is consistent with the exploratory

nature of the modeling.

Also, means, standard deviations, and

correlations for each model variable are provided in Appendix 1.
The assumptions associated with the principles of least squares
(QLS) may be relaxed to some degree when employing dichotomous and
ordinal variables (Kreps, 1983b). However, specific methodological
qualifications are in order regarding standard regression techniques.
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First, recall that step-wise procedures were used.

This means that

variable entry into any regression was determined by partial correlation
techniques.

As a consequence, important variables may be artificially

omitted from the equation at a loss of substantial insight.

A lesser

inclusion criterion is responsive to this concern, but creates other
problems with small samples such as this one.

For instance, if the

number of x variables exceeded or equalled the number of observations
the normal equation could not be given a unique solution (Hays, 1981).
Here, the ration of x variables to number of observations is high
(10:52) though not problematic given my concern with exploratory
modeling as opposed to hypothesis testing.

In addition, the frequent

use of reciprocal causation yields relatively distinct sets of
statistically significant independent variables.

Che potential effect

is to bias the coefficients of variables in the equation, thereby
creating estimation problems (Lewis-Beck, 1980) in regard to population
parameters.

Second, using dichotomous variables (0,1) as dependent

variables results in biased significance tests because of
heteroscedastic disturbances (Anderson, 1983).

Walsh and Warland (1983)

echo this point by suggesting that dichotomous dependent variables are
occasioned by estimation problems.

I have, however, replicated

regressions by use of discriminant techniques and detected no
significant problems.
dependent variables.

Third, four equations have ordinal indexes as
Although multiple regression techniques assume

normally distributed and interval level dependent variables and
measurement, I am relying, as others do, on the robustness of these
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techniques when assumptions have been violated.

Finally, a comment on

the model variables left in the equation by using step-wise techniques.
Simply because a variable is not in the final equation does not
necessarily mean that it has no influence (Anderson, 1983).

For

example, it may have been omitted because of multicolinearity.

Findings

in Appendix 1 suggest, however, that significant independent variables
are only moderately correlated.
The following section includes a brief outline and summary of the
findings presented in Tables 5 through 9.

Each finding represents an

empirically grounded relationship among properties of organization and
disaster.
Findings.SfcafcgaeofcSi

Origins (Table, 5,and,Table. 6

1.

The more complex the social network at origins (NINDEX1), the
later in the emergency period is organization enacted (TINT).

2.

Where participants in the enacting unit express high degrees
of concern for victim losses (PERS), the later in the emergency
period is organization enacted (TINT).

3.

Where participants in the enacting unit adopt a task structure
developed by others (TDEV), the later in the emergency period
is organization enacted (TINT).

4.

Where social links to dominant activity areas are great (SIDA),
the more likely is organization enacted in close proximity to the
primary impact area (PLPI).

5.

The larger the enacting unit (SIZ), the more conplex its social
network at the origins of organization (NINDEX1).

6.

When enacted by an emergent group of individuals as opposed to
an emergent group of other groups and organizations (FOT), the
more complex is the social network at the origins of organization
(NINDEXl).
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7.

Where the impacted community is metropolitan as opposed to
non-metropolitan (COMM), the less complex is the social network
at the origins of organization (NINDEX1).

8.

Where social links to dominant activity area are few (SLDA),
the more complex is the social network at the origins of organi
zation (NINDEXl).

9.

Where there is greater event forewarning (EVEKTCTP), the greater
the evidence of formal rationality at the origins of organiza
tion (QRG-PAT).

10.

The greater the disaster experience in the impacted community
(C-EXP) , the greater the evidence of collective behavior at the
origins of organization (QRG-PAT).
The four regressions at the initiation state of organization have

as dependent variables time of initiation (TINT), proximity to primary
impact area (PLPI), social network complexity (NINDEXl), and
organization pattern (QRG-PAT) and will be discussed respectively.
First, findings indicate that the spatial and torporal location of
orgnization at initiation is related to NINDEXl, PERS, TDEV, and SLDA.
Given these predictors, the overall tendency for emergent organization
is later initiation time relative to the occurence of event and
proximity to the primary impact area.
The relation of PERS and TINT (Statement 2) is interpreted as an
indication of participants' awareness of victims' needs and experiences
relative to the event.

Though in another context, Ranter (1977)

provides an account for the significance of PERS for emergent
organization at origins.

Ranter argues that early stages of

organization are characterized by high degrees of uncertainty and
pressures for similarity of participants.

Invariably, during the

origins of organization, key participants make choices about the
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TABLE 5:

Origins of Organization, Stage 1

Dependent Variables:

Significant
Independent
Variables

TINT
BETA

Time of Initiation
(TINT), Physical
Location to Primary
Impact (PLPI)

H£I
F

BETA

Event Related
Organization-Related
Social Network
at Origins
(NINDEXl)

.368

8.614***

Personal
Orientation
(PERS)

.339

7.203***

Task
Development
(TDEV)

-.249

Social Links
to Dominant
Activity Area
(SICA)

3.921*

.241

Constant

2.37

.150

£2

.25

.058

*p
**p
***p
****p

is
is
is
is

less
less
less
less

than
than
than
than

.10
.05
.01
.001

3.100*
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TABLE 6:

Origins of Organization, Stage 1

Dependent Variables:

Significant
Independent
Variables

Social Network
(NINDEXl), Origins
Pattern (OPG-PAT)
QRG-PAT
BETA

M M DGKl
BETA

Eygnt^.Related
Event Type
(EVENTTP)

.234

Unit Siz (SIZ)

.248

4.199**

Time of
Initiation
(TINT)

.328

8.302***

Social Links
to Dominant
Activity Area
(SIDA)

-.350

9.397***

Unit Type (FCT)

-.206

2.862*

3.142*

CQirmunitvUnit,Belated
Size (CCMM)

-.292

Disaster
Experience
(C-EXP)

-.296

1.557
.40

£2
*p
**p
***p
****p

is
is
is
is

less
less
less
less

6.344*

than
than
than
than

.10
.05
.01
.001

3.262
.16

5.013**
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inclusion of others.

Such choices reflect a selection process during

which homogeneous rather than diversified persons/groups become unit
members.

For new (emergent) organization, homogeneity is evidenced in

participants' conmunication wherein participants' personal background
and concern unfold.

On the other hand, participants of more established

units make selections about the inclusion of others based on homogeneity
of organization related experiences.

For each unit type "similarity of

outlook guarantees at least sane basis of trust and mutual
understanding" (Ranter, 1977, p.49).

Expressions of concern for

victims' personal losses may therefore, provide this key discretionary
feature at the origins of emergent organization.

As the response

unfolds, I suspect participants translate the above kind of awareness
into a pattern of organization at initiation on the collective behavior
end of the continuum.

The zero order correlations for PERS and ORG-PAT

(r=-.23) moderately support this hypothesis.
Francis and Kreps (1984) argue that emergent organization depends
on social unit comparability of emergent units and the broader social
network of the focal unit.

Where comparability, in terms of type of

unit, domain, and activities is evident so is the systemic
(interdependent) character of ecological organization.

Emergent units

are, however, more dissimilar vis-a-vis origins for reasons noted above
and because of their unique spatial and temporal features.

In addition,

the disaster event disrupts characteristics of ecological organization.
What happens then, as new (emergent) units overcome these
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differences and evolve toward organization as Kreps defines it?

First,

it is important to note that Kreps' referent is the individual social
unit.

On the other hand, population ecologists who are also concerned

with new organization study populations of social units which reflect
"species" similarity and survivorship in the disaster context (Kreps'
referent). Since emergent units evolve and operate in a dissimilar
environment, niche maintenance is critical for population membership.
But the niche or sphere of social action of emergent units is likely to
became less secure given their dissimilarity, thereby increasing the
need for boundary maintenance.
McKelvey (1982) defines a niche as "that set of external forces
that impose constraints on an individual organization or population of
organizations that are subject to its influence" (McKelvey, 1982,
p. 458).

Niches are the immediate portion of a response environment

which can be utilized and changed by emergent units.

In addition, a

niche is related to the spatial and temporal location of the emergent
unit, associated activities, and the allocation of scarce resources by
other units necessary for the enactment of organization.

Each of these

define the systemic space (niche width) for emergent units as members of
a population of social units.

In effect, McKelvey (1982) argues that

"autogenic" and "allogenic" forces interact relative to organization and
are central to the development of a niche.
organization hold to this opinion.
and Freeman, 1977;

But not all researchers of

For instance, some writers (Hannon

and other population ecologists) contend that the

environment is a causal factor in relation to organization (allogenic
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factors as predictors). Indeed, they argue (in different terras) that
environment related features "select out" types of social units that
evolve toward organization as defined by Kreps.
opposite:

Others argue just the

that organizations shape their environment (autogenic

factors), not vice versa.
Francis and Kreps (1984) found that both autogenic (closed system
strain at the maintenance of organization of existing units) and
allogenic forces (dissimilar routine activity types) constrain new
organization.

Similarly, findings on 52 emergent units show the

significance of autogenic and allogenic forces to the initiation of
organization.

Statements 7,9, and 10 point to autogenic forces at work.

Remaining statements highlight allogenic forces which characterize the
model of emergent organization.

In sum, by using Kreps' referent to

individual social units, we are better able to interpret what he calls
the hierarchical character of the ecological context as it relates to
emergent organization in the disaster setting.

By hierarchical Kreps,

drawing from the tradition of human ecology (Hawley, 1950), means that
populations are comprised of successive aggregations of units ordered to
facilitate economy in the acquisition and distribution of scarce
resources and other activities.

Hie hierarchical character points to

the systemic (interdependent) aspect of ecological context.

When

disrupted by disaster, the niche width expands making available systemic
space for new (emergent) organization.

Emergent units may, therefore,

enhance efficiencies critical for community survival by supplanting
hierarchical arrangements unable to meet disaster demands.
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Findings in the larger study (N=423) point to four predictor
variables in relation to ORG-PAT.

However, in this analysis only one

event and one community unit related variable predict ORG-PAT.
Statements 9 and 10 summarize the significant variable relationships in
the equation for ORG-PAT.

This would suggest that organization patterns

are difficult to predict with data on allogenic characteristics.

Yet,

the seemingly "spatial and temporal randomness of disaster impacts"
(Kreps, 1984b) and the evidenced "milling" (Turner and Killian, 1972)
which takes place in the emergency period (Statements 1, 2, and 6) point
to the dynamics of emergent units.

Still, some argue that organization

patterns at origins are at most random occurances for emergent units.
representative statement may be drawn from Weller (1969) who suggests
that "things just happen".

Rather than accept this view on the

randomness of origins, I believe that we simply need to collect better
data on what is happening. Available data on emergent units is simply
not rich enough to support Weller's (and others) contention.
Findings Statements;

Maintenance (Table 7 and Table 8)

1.

Domain-task complexity (CR5) and activities-resource complexity
(CR6) are mutually related at the maintenance state of organi
zation.

2.

Collective behavior at the origins of organization (ORG-PAT) is
related to domain-task complexity at the maintenance state of
organization (CR5).

3.

Where usable human attributes are less critical for the enact
ment of organization (KEYRES), there is greater evidence of
complexity in terms of activities-resources (CR6).

A
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4.

Where military resources are relevant to the enactment of organ
ization (LOCMIL), there is greater evidence of complexity in
terms of activities-resources (CR6).

5.

The later in the emergency period that organization is enacted
(TINT), the greater evidence of focused task structures
(FTSTRF).

6.

Where usable human attributes are less critical for the enact
ment of organization (KEYRES), there is greater evidence of
focused task structures (FTSTRF).

7.

Where participants in the enacting unit express a high degree
of concern for community damage and participant control of the
response (COMC), the more complex the social network at main
tenance (NINDEX2).

8.

The greater the complexity of resources— activities
restructuring (CR6), the more complex the social network at
maintenance (NINDEX2).

9.

Hie more complex the social network at origins (NINDEXl), the
more complex the social network at maintenance (NINDEX2).
Hie findings at the maintenance state of organization point to

similarities between emergent units and the total sample of responses in
the larger study.

Hie main one is included in Statement 1.

Findings

also highlight key continuities and discontinuities of the four elements
of organization, evidencing the duality of action and order.
It is important to remember that CR5 and CR6 are related measures
of response complexity in terms of "ends" (D T related) and "means" (A R
related).

In addition, they are interpreted as two distinct indicators

of response restructuring.

As in the larger study, my data point to the

continuity of the four elements of organization (Statement 1) and
highlight their independence as noted in the moderate zero order
correlation (r=.33). Hie observation that they are less than perfectly
correlated suggests that each index contributes unique information and
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TABLE 7:

Maintenance of Organization, Stage 2
Dependent Variables:

Significant
Independent
Variables

Complexity of
Response (CR5),
Complexity of
Response (CR6)

£R6-lmeaJ^I

CR5 (ends)
BETA

BETA

Event Related
Organization Related
Response
Complexity
(CR5)
Response
Complexity
(CR6)

.281

Organization
Pattern
(ORG-PAT)

-.254

Key Resource
at Initiation
(KEYRES)

.298

6.349**

-.309

6.904**

4.518**

3.703*

Community Unit Related
Involvement
of Military
(LOCMIL)
Constant
£2
*p
**p
***p
****p

is
is
is
is

.390

3.861
.17
less
less
less
less

than
than
than
than

.10
.05
.01
.001

2.275
.33

10.838***
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TABLE 8:

Maintenance of Organization, Stage 2
Dependent Variables:

Significant
Independent
Variables

Response Task
Structure Focus
(RTSTRF), Social
Network at
Maintenance
(NINDEX2)

NJM3JX2,

RTSTRF
BETA

BETA

£

Event Related
Organization Related
Time of
Initiation
(TINT)

.251

3.462*

.209

3.248*

Response
Complexity
(CR6)

.268

5.525**

Social Network
at Origins
(NINDEXl)

.429

13.498****

Community
Orientation
(COMC)
Key Resource
at Initiation
(KEYRES)

Constant
£2.

*p
**p
***p
****p

is
is
is
is

-.281

1.213
.18

less
less
less
less

than
than
than
than

.10
.05
.01
.001

4.347**

1.376
.39
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reflects measurement error probability.
Referenced at the maintenance state, Kreps (1983b) calls
domain-tasks dominated responses the predecessor of administrative
rationality and activity-resource dominated responses the predecessor of
forms of substantive rationality.

Domain-tasks dominated responses

highlight the continuity of action and order by means of routine
restructuring of the four elements of organization.

Starbuck (1983)

emphasizes this same point, though in different terms, in his discussion
of organization domains.

He argues that domains shape or orient key

participants' perceptions of ongoing activity.

In general, domains

provide a frame of reference for participants.

While domains facilitate

the understanding of action, participants' understanding tends to be
biased in the short run and out-dated in the long run.

By implication,

collective representations (domain, tasks) become increasingly insulated
from ongoing activity as the response unfolds.

That is, as formal

rationality at origins translates into administrative rationality at
maintenance, organization action may become unreflective and nonadaptive
as Starbuck implies.

Hie pattern continues until a crisis state

develops.
Kreps (1983b) found that the translation process (from D T
initiated responses to administrative rationality) evidenced in more
established groups was most apparent in patterns of response
restructuring.

Though not significant at the .10 inclusion level,

restructuring in terms of means (CR6) was lower (r=-.18) and
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restructuring in terms of ends (CR5) lower (r=-.30) where administrative
rationality dominated.

However, one of two case descriptions of pattern

restructuring at maintenance provides qualitative support in relation to
routine restructuring.

Note the following empirical example of a T R A

D pattern oforganization
increasingly

at initiation.

Here, domain and tasks become

insulated as the response unfolds.

But also, we evidence

activity-resource restructuring:
The domain of a group of local laundry associations is the
organization of providing victim basic needs. Hie response is
initiated about 30 hours following a severe hurricane (long
forewarning). Virtually thousands of victims are without
clothing, shelter, and electricity. One laundry association
that we knew of recognizes the extensive loss of clothing,
apparent by plane loads of clothing arriving shortly after
impact.
Contacts to other laundry establishments are made,
and a simple task structure is set up; one involvingpick-up
and delivery of clothes from the airport to each laundry
establishment, and subsequent cleaning and sorting into sizes
(T). For purposes of safety and efficiency the clothing is
cleaned and sorted prior to distribution. Each laundry
establishment pools resources and recruits vehicles and
volunteer drivers (R). Task related activities begin shortly
after resource mobilization (A). Once initiated and
activities are underway, Red Cross participation provides
external legitimation by joining the response (D). Key
participants do not anticipate the amount of resources and
type of coordinated activities necessary to complete disaster
demand. This is evident by the participants' mere suggestion
that the Red Cross transport the clothing to area shelters as
opposed to actively planning for the logical transition in
domain related activities and resources. Domain and tasks
become increasingly insulated from inadequate means at the
height of activity. The Red Cross, in response to the pending
contingency, contacts the Volunteers of America (V.O.A.)
because clothes cannot be transported without new resources
and activities. Hie V.O.A., in turn, brings to the response a
new set of resources (R); trucks and drivers as the primary
ones. Once mobilized the V.O.A. formulates new domain
related activities (A) and proceeds to disperse clothes to
shelter areas. Hie response ends when area shelters have an
adequate supply of clothing.
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Hie insulation of domain and tasks and restructuring of activities is
what Kreps (1983b) calls a "closed system strain toward administrative
rationality".
Preceded by response complexity in terms of means (CR6) and
participant concern for community damage and control of the response
(CQMC) , and a more complex social network at origins of organization
(NINDEXl) r the social network at maintenance becomes increasingly
complex (Statements 7, 8, and 9).

In addition, zero order correlations

show positive relationships between NINDEXl, NINDEX2, and response
complexity/contingency indicators (NINDEXl and CR5, r=.20;
GR6, r=.16?

NINDEXl and NINDEX2, r=.52;

NINDEXl and

NINDEX2 and CR5, r=.28;

NINDEX2 and CR6, r=.36). Given these predictors of network complexity
it seems as though emergent units show network based contingencies at
origins and as the response unfolds.

Seme of these problems have a

negative effect on the viability of emergent organization as the
following findings suggest.
Findings Statements : Suspension (Table 9)
1.

When enacted by emergent groups of individuals as opposed
to emergent groups of other groups and organizations (EOT),
the more likely is organization to persist until the demand
is met (POSP).

2.

Hie longer the duration of organization (HER), the less
likely will organization persist until the demand is met
(POSP).

3.

Hie more complex the response in terms of means (CR6), the
less likely will organization persist until the demand is met
(POSP).
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4.

The greater the size of the enacting unit (SIZ), the longer
the duration of organization (TTR).

5.

The greater the importance of usable human attributes at the
origins of organization (KEYRES), the longer the duration of
organization (TTR).

6.

lhe more complex the social network at origins (NINDEXl),
the shorter the duration of organization (TTR).

7.

Hie more complex the social network at the maintenance of
organization (NINDEX2), the longer the duration of organiza
tion (TTR).

8.

Where participants in the enactingunit develop their own
task structure (TDEV), the shorter the duration of organiza
tion (TTR) •

9.

Hie later in the emergency period that organization is
enacted (TINT) , the longer the duration of organization (TTR).
Hie most important finding in relation to suspension of

organization is that pattern of organization at origins (QRG-PAT) has no
significant relationship to reason for suspension or duration of
organization.

On the other hand, data from the larger study (N=423)

show a strong link between formal rationality at origins and persistence
of organization.
1975;

Hiis latter finding as well as related ones (Gamson,

Goldstone, 1980) support the hypothesis that more formally

patterned instances are likely to last longer and generally persist
until demand is met.

My data, however, simply do not support this

point.
Even though organization pattern at origins is not a predictor of
the persistence of organization, other findings point to the dynamics of
viable emergent units.

These are highlighted in Statements 1 through 3.

The chances for persistence are greater for shorter responses because
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TABLE 9:

Suspension of Organization, Stage 3

Significant
Independent
Variables

Dependent Variables:

£Q£P
BETA

Pattern of
Suspension (POSP),
Total Time of
Response (TER)
TIE

£

BETA

Organization Related
Unit Type (FOT)

-.296

6.496**

Unit Siz (SIZ)

.457

23.389****

Key Resource
at Initiation
(KEYRES)

.367

15.384****

Social Network
at Origins
(NINDEXl)

-.326

Social Network
at Maintenance
(NINDEX2)

.364

Task Development
(TDEV)

-.263

Response
-.249
Complexity (CR6)

.688
-.439

Constant
£2

1.378
.35

*p
**p
***p
****p

is
is
is
is

less
less
less
less

than
than
than
than

.10
.05
.01
.001

13.479****

9.168***

4.534**

Time of
Initiation (TINT)
Total Time of
Response (TER)

8.915***

14.005****
.006
.68

50.232****
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longer responses are likely to be absorbed by another entity once it
(absorbing entity) has had time to recoup relative to event.
More than any other equation, the regression for the duration of
organization (TER) points to the internal dynamics of emergent
organization.

Table 9 lists six organization unit variables which

relate to or facilitate response duration.

Tie number of significant

independent variables could be one general consequence of researchers*
increased time and opportunity to gather related data on longer emergent
responses.

Marx (1982) argues, however, that findings on organization

related variables are more prevalent because they are more tangible
(e.g., leaders, written statements, activities) than community or
environment related variables which, he believes, are simply more
difficult to decipher because of their indirect influence.
Tie observation that no community unit or event related variables
significantly relate to TTR does not mean, however, that emergent units
are autonomous entities whose persistence is determined by participants
alone.

Indeed, the regressions at origins and maintenance of

organization point to both autogenic and allogenic forces at work.
Furthermore, Francis and Kreps' (1984) study of 465 dyadic social
network relationships compliments our understanding of how the
ecological context of social units facilitates, prevents, or influences
the duration of organization.

I suspect, though, that examples of

organization and environment or community related variables which
influence emergent organization are less apparent and less frequently
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observed by researchers whose sole referent is organization sets or
populations, whose perspective on organization is static as opposed to
processual, and whose studies are in non-disaster settings.
Statement 4 points to the importance of accounting for property
variances at maintenance which may lead to pattern suspension or
reconstruction.

Here, larger enacting units are related to the longer

duration of organization.

But a decrease in SIZ to an undetermined

threshold level could set off a resource related response suspension,
thereby decreasing TER.

Statements 6 and 7 nicely illustrate Aveni's

(1978) contention that organization linkages are "of great consequence
to organizations".

According to Aveni, a linkage is any "recurrent

pattern of behavior which exists between two systems and is supported by
both" (Aveni, 1978, p.185). Thus, as Marx (1982) suggests, it is not
only the complexity of the social network at origins and maintenance
that influences organization duration and effectiveness but the content
and style of coirmunication patterns within the social network.

While

social units have direct links to a range of relevant persons and
organizations, the content and style of coirmunication between units may
have various consequences for the focal unit (e.g., positive or
negative). An example of a negative consequence resulting from
participation in a dyadic relationship may occur when the relevant other
uses tactics to create a negative image of the focal emergent unit
(e.g., disaster related bureaucracies which advise victims to reject
emergent units' offers of assistance) thereby decreasing external domain
legitimation.
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The main finding is summarized in Statement 9:

The later in the

emergency period that organization is enacted (TINT) , the longer the
duration of organization (TTR). Smelser (1962) argues, in relation to
this finding, that emergent units have first, "vague inclusive goals"
and second, a rapid "growth rate" relative to an event which creates a
comparably rapid rate

of decline (Wood, 1982) • Yet, the emergentunits

in this analysis have

clearly defined domains at initiation.

Furthermore, as marginals for TINT suggest emergent units develop at
various times relative to the event.

The regression of TER and

marginals for TINT suggest to me that not all emergent units fit
Smelser1s model in terms of process initiation and duration.

More

important, the significance of the timing of enactment on TTR stresses
the need for more variables on this dimension of organization.
The following section provides a more comprehensive summary of
model findings.

Here

I discuss key points of emphasis mentioned

throughout the analysis of 52 emergent units,

related attributesof

emergent units, and directions for subsequent analyses on organization
and emergent units.

DISCUSSION

Hie data obtained from the DRC interviews have provided useful and
interesting information about emergent units and the process of
organization.

Hie model of organization considers directly the origins,

maintenance, and suspension of emergent organization.
I have restricted the analysis to direct relationships captured by
multiple regression techniques.
for two reasons.

I consider this approach appropriate

First, in consideration of the methodological

qualifications associated with step-wise procedures, I would not feel
comfortable making anything other than conservative statements on model
findings.

Second, and more important, the model is devised only as a

tool for data organization and filtering.

Hie findings provided,

therefore, are intended to facilitate hypothesis generation.

In effect,

ny objective has not been to test hypotheses, rather to "conmunicate the
general thrust of the theory while avoiding statistical artifact in
modeling" emergent organization (Kreps, 1983b).
Building on Kreps (1983a;

1983b;

1984a;

1984b;

1984c) theory

and taxonomy of organization, I am not trying to "explain" a certain
type of social unit, but rather to consider directly the uniqueness of
emergent units.
Much has been indicated in iry own and Kreps1 analyses about the
forms of organization.

We have emphasized both structure and process.

I have, however, also included social and psychological variables in the
model.

Some of these variables were significantly related to
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initiation, maintenance, and suspension of organization.

I am not sure,

however, about the degree to which social psychological variables, in
general, either enhance or confuse the description and understanding of
Kreps' definition of organization.

Regardless, some are influential

factors in the process of organization.

From a sociological

perspective, I would argue that a structural definition of organization
is appropriate.

But, in view of the findings and my work with the case

interviews, I believe that any attempts to explain the origins and
process of organization without at minimum, addressing social
psychological variables is unrealistic and misleading (Walsh and
Warland, 1983).

Though, like others, I have speculated the desirable

"theoretical mix of form and content" (Kreps, 1983a) which would best
engulf the "guts of the phenomena called organization".

Mine is at best

a reflection, a beginner's guess.
Model findings clearly point to the critical role of the spatial
and temporal dimensions of organization.

Central to the notion of

process, these variables encourage a new direction regarding data
collection and theory construction.

As Giddens (1979) states, spatial

and temporal elements are integral to social theory.

However, the

comnunication or demonstration of their theoretical relevance is
contingent upon empirical findings described in a way which is
informative.

This is why I have provided the reader with case

descriptions from ny analysis.
In addition to the model findings, marginals from the data suggest
some positive attributes in relation to emergent units.

Certainly,
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marginals do not "tell" us what emergent units are like.

Rather, they

have left this researcher with a few revised connotations in relation to
emergent units.

I would like to share some of these perceptions.

First, many responses (N=32) were engaged in time urgent disaster
demands.

That is, they were performing functions which had to be

confronted immediately.
until the demand was met.

Second, twenty-six of the responses persisted
Of those which did not, eleven were absorbed

by another entity (e.g., Red Cross).
this analysis are "organized".
domain legitimation.
things;

Finally, all of the responses in

By definition, all received some form of

That is, relevant others were doing one of several

referring victims, providing response resources, giving verbal

approval, or recognizing responses as responsible for a given disaster
demand and making the recognition public,

in this sense, "emergent"

units are not unlike "established" forms of organization.

In addition,

findings at the maintenance state of organization point to other key
similarities.

In sum, findings suggest, to me, that emergent units,

ephemeral responses, are not necessarily "unstructured" (Lang and Lang,
1961), "problematic" (Parr, 1969), or "relatively unorganized" (Perry
and Pugh, 1978).
But can we classify emergent units in a more definitive fashion?
Gamson (1975) and Goldstone (1980) evaluate emergent units in terms of
their consequences which are called either "success" or "failure".
Their comments highlight the multidimensional quality of "success" and
"failure", and unfortunately, compel one to question the efficacy of the
concepts in relation to organization.

For example, Gamson says that one
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qualification for "more successful" challenges of protest groups is
their ability to gain acceptance from relevant others.

However, what he

deems as indicative of a degree of success, Kreps would classify as part
of organization development (e.g., domain external legitimation).
Starbuck (1983), on the other hand, implies in different terms that
forms of collective behavior "fail" in the long run.

Failure is not,

however, related to rejection on the part of relevant others.

Rather,

where collective representations are questionable, the viability of the
enacting unit is at stake.
for two reasons.

My data do not support Starbuck*s suggestion

First, the regression of pattern of suspension (FQSP)

shews no significant relationship to pattern of organization at origins
(ORG-PAT). Second, the distributions of organization patterns listed on
Table 1 and the metric of organization forms listed on Table 4 reveal
that emergent units encompass the entire range of forms of organization.
Still, more needs to be said about the origins of organization in
general for they are theoretically informative and critical for our
understanding of the process of organization.
I suspect that the failure to consider directly the origins of
organization and other things social has played a part in keeping
sociology from an important, still neglected objective.

The objective

concerns the need to merge collective behavior and organization
perspectives.

The result of such a merger would provide gains for the

discipline as a whole, not so much for each perspective as a specialty.
Judging from ny exposure to both, they seem to be generating ideas about
and working with phenomena which are part and parcel to the same
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underlying process of organization (Kreps, 1983a). Each specialty and
related ideas have, in varying degree pointed to an awareness of
emergent structural and processual features of organization.

Hie

ability to grasp the observed elements and different patterns of
organization as defined by Kreps is not, however, beyond the reach of
either specialty provided some theoretical and research collaboration is
initiated and maintained.
Clearly, some (Weller, 1973;

and others) have anticipated the

sociological gains resulting from a theoretical merger.
failure to integrate persists.

Still, the

Drawing from and elaborating upon Kreps'

(1984a) insights, the following are a few reasons why the segregation
between collective behavior and organization perspectives may have
persisted thus far.
The study of disasters has been consistently defined as an
interdisciplinary specialty.

It has, however, only recently been

adopted as a central topic in collective behavior (Perry and Pugh,
1978).

Second, and related, the study of disaster has failed to emerge

from what Gamson (1975) calls the "straitjacket" of collective behavior.
By this Gamson is referring to the theoretical restrictions of
collective behavior studies.

Ihough some would disagree, I believe that

collective behavior theories have traditionally considered the origins
and consequences of emergent social action.

Ihey have, though, ignored

the social properties of emergent collectivities (Kreps, 1984a). In
addition, collective behavior phenomena are frequently analyzed by means
of ad hoc theorizing (Weller and Quarantelli, 1973).
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The third reason for perspective segregation involves the content
of much past and contemporary organization studies.

In the haste to

analyze the content of organization, too many researchers have assumed
the existence of organization.

And, in doing so, researchers avoid the

"numerous difficulties associated with the study of the emergent
organization and organization set" (Foss, 1980, p.36).

This procedure

for research has led to inadequate attempts to provide a clear
definition of emergent units.

For when one assumes organization rather

than viewing it as problematic, the result is a parochial understanding
of process (Kreps, 1983a). It gives short shrift to one of two critical
features of organization;

the element of process.

While the gap between the two perspectives is theoretical in
nature, I suspect that this is highly related to their often segregated
research situations.

Collective behaviorists have traditionally studied

crowd behavior, civil disturbances, and more recently disaster events.
Organization researchers have usually studied variations of more
institutionalized behavior.
Researchers from each specialty area who have studied disaster
events are, however, presented with a unique opportunity to observe both
collective behavior and more formally rational instances of
organization.

Many people somehow "expect" more established units to be

engaged in disaster related activities.

Because natural disasters often

(1) create time limits on emergent organization (e.g., total time
available before emergent unit disaster demand is met) and (2) sometimes
alter the conditions of the impacted area emergent units develop to fill
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new demands (Parr, 1970).

nrThe occurrence of a disaster can, therefore,

be used as an indicator or notification of the possible formation" of
emergent units (Ross, 1980, p.35) • For researchers from each specialty,
no such "convenient notification" exists in more routine settings.
My point is not to simply advocate disaster studies though I stress
their sociological relevance.

Rather, ny objective is and has been to

present an argument for (1) the critical role of origins on regard to
organization, (2) the relationship between emergent and more established
processes of organization, and (3) the rejection of the superficial
distinction between collective behavior and organization perspectives.
I believe that a continuation of the theoretical and research
segregation is not only unnecessary but detrimental for the overall
advancement of a sociological theory of "organization".
Integration is possible.

But, as Kreps says, at least two

requirements must be met for this to happen.

First, sociologists must

shed the notion that disaster and emergency studies are an encapsuled
realm of inquiry.

To the contrary, they serve as fertile grounds for

gaining insights concerning organization, other things social, and human
vulnerability.

Equally important, organization and collective behavior

specialists need to develop a sociological and processual perspective of
these phenomena.

Since I believe that actions speak louder than words,

it is my hope that the preceding account of my research process
contributes to meeting these requirements.
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APPENDIX Is Means, Standard Deviations,
and Correlations of Model Variables
1
1 . EVENTTP 1.00
2.

ACHQ

3.

COMM

4.

C-EXP

5.

LOCMIL

6.

TINT

7.

H jPI

8.

SIZ

9.

KEYRES

10.

FOT

11.

DESTAB

12.

TDEV

13.

SLDA

14.

EMP

15.

PERS

16.

COMC

17.

NINDEX1

18.

ORG-PAT

19.

CR5

20.

CR6

21.

KESTRF

22.

N INDEX2

23.

TER

24.

POSP

Mean
Std. Dev.

2
.10

3
-.38

4
-.18

5
.28

6
-.20

7
.04

8
.25

1.00

-.08

-.16

-.01

-.16

.15

-.07

1.00

.10

-.12

-.04

.13

-.02

1.00

.00

.28

.09

.13

1.00

-.08

.03

.19

1.00

.16

-.03

1.00

.07

1.00

2.21
.87

.62
.49

.50
.50

2.31
1.18

.44
.50

3.10
1.49

.29
.46

2.79
1.19
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APPENDIX Is Means, Standard Deviations, and
Correlations of Model Variables, Continued
9

1

. EVENTTP -.10

10
-.09

11
.16

12
.35

13
.24

14
.26

15
-.02

16
-.29

2.

ACEN

.05

.14

-.10

.21

-.06

.04

.01

.00

3.

COMM

-.04

-.15

-.17

-.21

-.08

-.16

.12

-.08

4.

C-EXP

-.19

.05

-.11

-.12

-.10

.13

.29

.13

5.

LOCMIL

.07

-.03

-.33

.06

-.25

.14

.06

.04

6.

TINT

-.30

.01

-.04

-.19

.02

-.13

.27

.20

7.

FLPI

-.19

-.18

-.13

-.08

.24

.12

-.01

-.21

8.

SIZ

-.28

-.33

.09

.10

.06

.08

.08

.08

9.

KEXRES

1.00

.27

.06

.09

-.19

-.03

-.24

.19

1.00

-.12

-.07

-.02

.07

-.02

.15

1.00

.18

-.01

.02

-.05

.00

1.00

-.12

.07

.13

.00

1.00

.04

.09

-.40

1.00

-.09

-.31

1.00

-.12

10.

EOT

11.

DESTAB

12.

TOEV

13.

SLDA

14.

EMP

15.

PEES

16.

OOMC

17.

NINDEX1

18.

ORG-PAT

19.

CR5

20.

CR6

21.

RTSTRF

22.

NINDEX2

23.

TTR

24.

POSP

Mean
Std. Dev.

1.00

.48
.50

.54
.50

.69
.47

.85
.36

.62
.49

.58
.50

.40
.50

.50
.50
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APPENDIX Is Means, Standard Deviations, and
Correlations of Model Variables, Continued

1. EVENTTP

17
.02

18
.29

19
.00

20
.18

21
-.15

22
-.03

23
-.25

24
.01

2.

ACTN

-.02

-.01

-.08

-.11

-.25

-.17

-.20

-.01

3.

COMM

-.25

-.14

.18

-.05

-.15

-.10

.12

.12

4.

C-EXP

.11

-.34

-.02

.11

.27

.09

.33

-.33

5.

LOCMIL

.23

.06

.12

.40

-.23

.28

.03

-.17

6.

TINT

.32

.03

-.07

.00

.34

.16

.57

-.30

7.

FLPI

.08

.10

-.08

-.08

-.06

-.11

.12

-.05

8.

SIZ

.29

-.07

.18

.28

.12

.12

.25

-.04

9.

KEYRES

-.08

.09

.06

-.26

-.36

-.02

.03

.00

10.

POT

-.23

-.05

-.07

-.05

-.05

-.10

-.05

-.26

11.

DESTAB

-.04

.15

-.05

-.14

.15

.08

-.01

.01

12.

TDEV

.04

.01

-.05

.11

.05

-.05

-.34

.17

13.

SLDA

-.30

.05

-.08

-.07

.01

-.22

.01

-.01

14.

EMP

.10

-.14

.02

.14

.11

-.06

-.14

-.10

15.

FERS

-.11

-.23

-.03

.24

.14

-.07

.21

-.26

16.

GOMC

.25

-.09

.03

.12

-.02

.35

.24

-.27

17.

NINDEX1 1.00

-.04

.20

.16

.19

.52

.18

-.23

18.

ORG-PAT

1.00

-.31

-.19

-.02

-.10

-.10

.16

19.

CR5

1.00

.33

-.03

.28

.18

-.24

20.

CR6

1.00

.11

.36

.13

-.29

21.

RTSTRF

1.00

.09

.20

-.13

22.

NINDEX2

1.00

.36

-.32

23.

TTR

1.00

-.46

24.

FQSP

Mean
Std. Dev.

1.00
1.83
.86

3.29
1.55

3.50
2.36

3.54
2.57

1.52
1.20

2.54
.78

2.62
.95

.44
.50

APPENDIX 2:

Response #118:

Case Descriptions

A R T D

Public Information

'Hie domain of the response is dispersal of public information.

Hie

business district of a metropolis receives heavy damages following an
earthquake.

A neighboring suburb suffers from extensive damages.

IVo

days post-impact, a civilian walks into the search and rescue office
located in a downtown administration building, and offers his
assistance.

He doens't request a particular activity, just the

opportunity to help.

At the time of his offer, the rescue group is

about to start compiling a list of homes located in the impacted suburb
area.

From this area, about 100 persons are assumed dead or missing and

need to be accounted for.

Hie civilian, with the aid of three city

secretaries begins response activities by making calls to local persons
(A). Hie small group subsequently acquires a key resource;

a hotline

originally set up for Civil Defense use (R). Once activities are
initiated and resources mobilized the unit develops a simple task
structure whereby they receive calls on the hotline and use the radio to
broadcast names of missing persons (T). Requests are made to local
residents to call in and report seeing persons thought missing or dead.
Verified names are systematically crossed off the list using this
procedure.

Hie operation is recognized and identified as a clearing

house for missing persons (D). Hiree days after the first radio
broadcast the emergency period and urgency of the response subsides.
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Every name on the original list is cleared and the responsibility for
other missing person cases is handed over to the Salvation Army.
Response participants disband.

Hie first civilian goes heme and the

secretaries return to their regular office duties in another city
building.
Response #266:

R D A T

Mobilization of Personnel

Hie domain of the response involves mobilization of emergency
personnel.

TVo months prior to extensive flooding from snow runoff

(long forewarning) the student body president (s.b.p.)

of a local

university anticipates the need for student assistance.

Aware of

community unit experience with flooding and associated event demands
(e.g., sand-bagging) the s.b.p.

contacts the City Council and offers

student services for such demands.
the s.b.p.

Acting as the on-campus coordinator,

contacts various student organizations (e.g., Greek,

resident hall assistants), and thereby mobilizes hundreds of students
for the upcoming demands (R). IWo days before flooding begins, a city
comnisioner contacts the s.b.p.
(D).

and requests the services of students

Immediately students go to locations and begin response activities

(A). Response problems develop early when requests get doubled up.
instance, calls are made for 300 students when only 50 are needed.

For
In

general, students are fed up with the current pattern of operation.
response, the s.b.p.

In

seeks assistance from the university president.

Together they develop a task structure which includes the acquisition of
city maps, establishment of a manpower office in the student government
office, and a downtown office staffed by students (T). In addition, the
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president cancels scheduled school classes for two days.

This decision

is critical for the continuation of student participation.

One day

before the flood water crests and begins to recede, students are forced
to terminate response activities.

Hie president refuses to extend the

time of class cancelation and sets of response suspension.
Response #293;

T R D A

Public Information

The domain of the response, enacted by local media groups, is
public information.

Hours following a flood, an executive town meeting

is held to discuss pending issues.

Persons present include the mayor,

city officials, the director of a local radio station, and
representatives from various city organizations.

One issue of debate

centers on local media coverage of the flood and related instructions to
the public.

In general, the media is charged with releasing incorrect

information to the public.

In response to the criticisms, the director

of a local radio station suggests the implementation of a task structure
for local media.

For instance, he recommends developing a local media

pool, and setting up simultaneous radio-TV hook-ups in an effort to
centralize and filter the information flow.

Members present approve the

recommendation (T). Hie mayor amends the approval and asks the director
to assume responsibility for mobilizing the media pool.
accepts.
mobilized.

The director

Forty minutes following the town meeting resources are
The director contacts the manager or owner of every local

radio and TV station (R). Each proceed to the Civic Center which is
also serving as the Central Flood Control Center.

Here, the media pool

is established (D). The director presents station representatives with
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the need for consistent publicized information regarding evacuation
procedures.

They discuss types of activities which could best

accomplish this objective.

Within an hour of their arrival at the

Control Center, response activities begin.

Newspersons are broadcasting

public information over radio and TV from the centralized location (A).
Broadcasts are hourly during the first few days of operation.

Ihe

frequency of broadcasts are gradually decreased and end when the
evacuation process is over.

APPENDIX 3:

Item;

Coding System

Columns

Variable label

Organized disaster response nurnh^r?
Event nunber;
Event type;

EVENTN

Activity type;

=
=
=
=

4 (1-4)
2 (5-6)

EVENTTP
1
2
3
4

r e sp w

2 (7-8)
earthquake
tornado
flood
hurricane

ACTN

2 (9-10)

1 = hazard-jvulnerability analysis
2 = maintenance of standby human and
material resources
3 = disaster preparedness, planning, and
training
4 = public education
5 = hazard mitigation-structural
6 = hazard mitigation-nonstructural
7 = insurance
8 = issuance of predictions and warnings
9 = dissemination of predictions and warnings
10 = evacuation
11 = mobilization of emergency personnel
and resources
12 = protective action
13 = search and rescue
14 = medical care
15 = providing victim basic needs
(food, clothing, shelter)
16 = damage and needs assessments and
inventory of available resources
17 = damage control
18 = restoration of essential public services
19 = public information
20 = traffic control
21 = law enforcement
22 = local governance
23 = coordination and control (organization of
emergency personnel and resources)
24 = reconstruction of physical structures
25 = re-establishment of production, distribution,
and consumption activities (economic functioning)
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26 = resumption of other social institutions
27 = determination of responsibility and legal
liability for the event
28 = other
Activity pattern type;
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

=
=
=
=

=
=
=
=

=
=
=
=

=
=

=
=

=
=
S=

=
=
=

=
=

Total time of response;

ORG-PAT
D
D
D
D
D
D
T
T
T
T
T
T
R
R
R
R
R
R
A
A
A
A
A
A

T
T
R
R
A
A
R
R
A
A
D
D
A
A
D
D
T
T
D
D
T
T
R
R

R
A
A
T
T
R
A
D
D
R
R
A
D
T
T
A
D
A
T
R
D
R
D
T

2 (11-12)

A
R
T
A
R
T
D
A
R
D
A
R
T
D
A
T
A
D
R
T
R
D
T
D

TTR

4 (18-21)

days
9999 = missing value
Social linkages to dominant activity areas;

SLDA

1 = few if any, socially isolated
2 = several, strongly interrelated with
dominant activity area

1 (22)
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Initiation of organized disaster response:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

PINT

= self-contained
= boundary spanning, local
= boundary spanning, state
= boundary spanning, national
= boundary spanning-mixed local and state
= boundary spanning-mixed local and national
= boundary spanning-mixed state and national
= boundary spanning-mixed local,state, and national
= uncertain

Nuirber of, organizational links at, initiation; INLINKS
0
1
2
3

1 (23)

1 (25)

= none
= 1 - 3
= more than 3
= uncertain

Physical location relative to primary- impact;___ELEI

1 (26)

1 = close
2 = peripheral
Factors drawn upon by participants to sustain conmunication
among participants and relevent others . . .
Victim losses,, emotional:__LOSSl.

1 (28)

1 = no
2 = yes
Victim losses, structural or material:

LOS52

1 (29)

1 = no
2 = yes
Overall community damages

CDMGE

1 (30)

1 = no
2 = yes
Participant control of response:
1 = no
2 = yes

OOMQON

1 (31)
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■Sl£^thy_for_ptbersj

^P

1 (32)

1 = no
2 = yes
Domain establishment at initiation:
1 = established
legitimated
2 = established
legitimated
9 = uncertain
Domain definition problems;

by
by
by
by

DESTAB

1 (33)

participants then
relevant others
relevant others then
participants

DDPR

1 (37)

1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
Response task structure;

RTSTR

1 (38)

1 = simple
2 = complex
9 = uncertain
Task Structure focus at initiation;
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

RTSTRF

1 (39)

no
yesf physically
yes, socially
yes, temporally
yes, mixed-physically and socially
yes, mixed-physically and temporally
yes, mixed-socially and temporally
yes, mixed-physically,socially,temporally
uncertain

Task definition problems:

TDFR

1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain

1 (49)

82

Task structure development;

TDEV

1 (50)

1 = tasks developed by participants
2 = tasks developed by relevant other (s)
then incorporated by participants
9 = uncertain
Resource mobilization problems;

RMPR

1 (54)

1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
Key resource at initiation;
1
2
3
4
9

=
=
=
=
=

kf v r e s

1 (59)

usable human attributes
money
equipment, tools
information from other resonding units
uncertain

Activities performance problems; APPR

1 (60)

1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
Reason for suspension:

POSP

1 (66)

1 = no
2 = yes
Response suspended due to loss or depletion
of human or material resources; RSUSP-L

1 (67)

1 = no
2 = yes
Response absorbed bv another entity, designated
and legitimated by participants; RSUSP-DL
1 = no
2 = yes

1 (68)
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Response absorbed by, another entity, after
resistance, by^particjpantsj ggUgPr^L.

1 (69)

1 = no
2 = yes
Response absorbed.by, another entity after
resistance bv absorbing entity: RSUSF-A2

1 (70)

1 = no
2 = yes
Response absorbed bv another entity as
designated by a_ third party: R5USP-A3

1 (71)

1 = no
2 = yes
Response not suspended at interviews

NRSUSP

1 (72)

1 = no
2 = yes
Reason for suspension uncertainsRSUSPU

1 (73)

1 = no
2 = yes
Indication of reconstruction at maintenance:

RECON

1 (74)

1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
Size of focal organization:__SI£
1
2
3
4
9

=
=
=
=
=

9 or fewer
10 to 20
21 to 50
over 50 members
uncertain

Community disaster experience in past 10 years;
1
2
3
4
9

=
=
=
=
=

1 (75)

OEXP

no disastersf few if any threats
no disasters,several threats
one or moredisasters
one or moredisasters and several threats
uncertain

1 (76)
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Comnunitv (rural-urban); QQMM
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

1 (77)

rural area
urban 10,000 or less
urban 10r000 to 25,000
urban 25,000 to 50,000
urban metropolitan, 50,000+

Response location relative to military
resources: LOCMIL

1 (78)

1 = at some distance from military bases
and supplies
2 = military bases and supplies in close
proximity but not relevant to response
3 - military bases and supplies in close
proximity and relevant to response
9 = relevance to response uncertain
Type of focal organization: _FOT

1 (79)

0 = emergent groups of other groups
and organizations
1 = emergent groups of individuals
Maintenance of organized response:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

FMSTT

self-contained
boundary spanning local
boundary spanning state
boundary spanning national
boundary spanning-mixed local and state
boundary spanning-mixed local and national
boundary spanning-mixed state and national
boundary spanning-mixed local,state,national
uncertain

Number of organizational links at maintenance:
0
1
3
9
Time of initiation:
0
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=

1 (1)

MNLINKS

none
1-3
more than 3
uncertain

TINT
=
=
=
=
=
=

1 (3)

pre-impact 72+
pre-impact -72
1 to 2 hours post-impact
3 to 24 hours post-impact
25 to 72 hours post-impact
beyond 72 hours post-impact

1 (4)
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